CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

CCD/PV.466
21 April 1970
ENGLISH

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND SIXTY-SIXTH MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 21 April 1970, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. I. ABE (Japan)

(Previous verbatim records in this series appeared under the symbols ENDC/PV.1-ENDC/PV.430).

GE.70-8163
70-35444

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Argentina:	Mr. A.F. DUMONT
	Mr. V.E. BERASATEGUI
Brazil:	Mr. C.A. de SOUZA e SILVA
	Mr. L.F. PALMEIRA LAMPREIA
Bulgaria:	Mr. T. PETROV
	Mr. I. PEINIRDJIEV
Burma:	U KYAW MIN
Canada:	Mr. G. IGNATIEFF
	Mr. R.W. CLARK
	Mr. J.R. MORDEN
Czechoslovakia:	Mr. M. VEJVODA
	Mr. J. STRUCKA
	Mrs. Z. FIALOVA
Ethiopa:	Mr. A. ZELLEKE
Hungary:	Mr. I. KOMIVES
	Mr. J. PETRAN
	Mr. I. SARKADI
India:	Mr. M.A. HUSAIN
	Mr. K.P. JAIN
Italy:	Mr. R. CARACCIOLO
	Mr. F.L. OTTIERI
	Mr. U. PESTALOZZA

Japan:	Mr. I. ABE
	Mr. H. OTSUKA
	Mr. J. SAKAMOTO
	Mr. Y. HAMADA
Mexico:	Mr. M. TELLO
Mongolia:	Mr. M. DUGERSUREN
	Mr. Z. ERENDO
Morocco:	Mr. A.T. BENHIMA
	Mr. N. EL FASSI
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Netherlands:	Mr. H.F. ESCHAUZIER
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Romania:	Mr. I. DATCU
	Mr. O. IONESCO
	Mr. V. PARASCHIV
	Mr. N. CHILIE
Sweden:	Mrs. A. MYRDAL
	Mr. A. EDELSTAM
	Mr. T. BENGTSON
	Mr. R. BOMAN

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:	Mr. A.A. ROSHCHIN
	Mr. V.V. SHOUSTOV
	Mr. L.A. MASTERKOV
	Mr. V.B. TOULINOV
United Arab Republic:	Mr. H. KHALLAF
	Mr. O. SIRRY
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United Arab Republic:	Mr. I.F. PORTER
	Mr. W.N. HILLIER-FRY
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	Mr. R. HOULISTON
United States of America:	Mr. J.F. LEONARD
	Mr. A.R. DAY
	Mr. W. GIVAN
	Mr. W.B. CUTTER
Yugoslavia:	Mr. M. BOZINOVIC
	Mr. V. VUKOVIC
	Mr. S. RASIC
Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General:	Mr. W. EPSTEIN

1. The CHAIRMAN (Japan): I declare open the 466th plenary meeting of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.

2. Mr. BENHIMA (Morocco) (interpretation from French): I want my first words to be an expression to the United States delegation of our admiration and our most sincere congratulations on the return since our last meeting of the astronauts. We parted with so much anxiety and hope, and we are very happy to know that meanwhile not only has the scientific and technical organization which helped the astronauts to return to earth proved an extraordinary technical performance, but above all we have found in the three men a new dimension of human courage, that element which adds genuine emotion to our admiration.

3. May I now express my thanks to all my colleagues for the very kind words of welcome they addressed to me when I arrived here at the beginning of the month to join in the work of the Committee on Disarmament. I should like also to renew personally the wishes Mr. Khattabi addressed to Mr. Epstein, the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General, on behalf of the Moroccan delegation.

4. I do not believe I exaggerate in saying that rarely has a session of this Committee taken place in an international atmosphere more propitious for the real progress of the disarmament plan. Apart from political events, striking or otherwise, which strengthened the tendency towards lessening tension in international relations at the end of last year and at the beginning of this year and the fortunate consequences of which undoubtedly extended to the negotiations on disarmament, important decisions have been taken in this precise field which have had a positive effect on the nature of the debate both within and outside this Committee.

5. First there was the opening of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) in Helsinki on 15 December 1969. That meeting, announced long ago by the two Powers directly concerned, was compromised many times by political vicissitudes, but the mere fact of its taking place constitutes an indisputable victory over the scepticism which surrounded the announcement. Moreover, the resumption in Vienna on 15 April 1970, after a relatively short time, strengthens the hope of the international community for more and more dynamic discussions and negotiations on disarmament.

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6. On the other hand, the entry into force of the non-proliferation Treaty (ENDC/226*) might reasonably facilitate the prosecution of efforts to achieve other collateral measures likely to speed up the stages which separate us from general and complete disarmament. Obviously, there are still many fields of disarmament, and not the least important of these, outside the scope of that Treaty. Its inadequacies, its weaknesses and its omissions have been the subject of comment and even of severe criticism on the part of many countries. As far as we are concerned, we have admitted some of them and recognized their pertinence when they were made in a spirit of rigorous objectivity. But we have also defended without hesitation the value and the positive character of the Treaty despite the limitations of its scope. It is our conviction that if the ultimate objective of the efforts exerted for a number of years remains the total and final removal of the dangers represented by the armaments race, the serious political and technical obstacles standing in the way leave us with only one alternative, namely to seek partial solutions which can lead progressively, and if need be indirectly, to the final goal. It is in this spirit that, after having been among the first to defend the non-proliferation Treaty, we signed it on the very day on which it was deposited.

7. I have great pleasure in announcing to the Committee that the Government of His Majesty the King has decided to ratify the Treaty and that the procedure giving effect to this decision is now on the point of completion, so that the instruments of ratification will be deposited with the depositary governments of the Treaty forthwith. However, we are obliged to note that a large number of countries continue to be reserved, if not reticent, with regard to the Treaty, which in consequence still has not achieved the universality which would make it the greatest contribution to the efforts of recent years aimed at the progressive elimination of the obstacles to nuclear disarmament. On the other hand, this situation remains fraught with preoccupations and even anxieties for countries which, like Morocco, are directly affected by a regional political and military situation constantly aggravated by the immediate presence of a country which has certainly passed beyond the nuclear threshold and which, in any case, brandishes periodically the threat of this potential new power. Our unconditional commitment necessarily implies our firm hope that all signatory countries will effectively associate their efforts, notably by the loyal and complete application of the Treaty, in order to ensure its widest acceptance.

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8. The Moroccan Government has also decided to accede to the Geneva Protocol of 1925 concerning the prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons (A/7575/Rev.1, annex VI). This accession will also take place within several days, the requisite procedure being on the point of completion.

9. If in connexion with the non-proliferation Treaty I have confined myself simply to recalling the principles which have guided our attitude and those which ought to determine our action in the future, I should like to be able to explain at greater length our position on the question of the prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons and to make certain observations on the drafts of a convention submitted for examination by the Committee on Disarmament.

10. Here also the determining factor of our position stems from our deep and constant conviction that any form of prohibition of any category of weapons is a positive measure on the difficult path of the reduction of armaments which can usefully contribute to a considerable improvement in international relations, which are being marked increasingly by the competition between certain Powers in the development of military arsenals and the possession of ever more effective means of warfare. It is true that the problem of the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons is not new. Whereas the First World War led to the appearance of conventional weapons of more powerful and more deadly types, the use of toxic chemical substances during the conflict appeared as an innovation of a special horror not merely on account of the number of victims but also and perhaps above all because of the nature of this new and atrocious means of waging war. Furthermore, the international conscience, legitimately anxious, was able in the immediate post-war years to secure the censure and condemnation of recourse to the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons. Apart from the demilitarization measures imposed on the defeated countries in some zones of their territory and a relative limitation of their military potential, no decision concerning disarmament could be taken then. The agreement reached on the problem of chemical and bacteriological means of warfare thus had an exceptional character. The Geneva Protocol of 1925 is in this respect a remarkable result, and we are justified in thinking that it constituted a brake on, a sort of guard-rail against, the temptations of the belligerants during the Second World War. Unfortunately, if it has more or less stopped the effective use of these means of war so far, nevertheless it has not limited the process of their production and stockpiling. On the contrary, the progress made in their development and improvement increases the risk of their possible use for military purposes.

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11. If the international community, on the morrow of the world war, was more immediately preoccupied with the imminent danger of nuclear weapons, whose frightful character it had come to know, it nevertheless did not lose sight of the real danger of chemical and bacteriological weapons, improvement of which was going on at the same time as scientific progress in corresponding fields. The United Nations has constantly denounced the danger inherent in the existence and the possible use of these weapons, and during the twenty-fourth session of the General Assembly it requested the Committee on Disarmament, by resolution 2603 B (XXIV) (CCD/275), to reach an agreement on the prohibitions and other measures envisaged in the draft conventions submitted by the United Kingdom (ENDC/255/Rev.1) and the nine socialist countries (A/7655) respectively.

12. Unlike the problem of the prohibition of nuclear weapons, where the United Nations and especially the Committee on Disarmament must create out of nothing an appropriate legal framework, the essence of the problem of chemical and bacteriological weapons is already to be found within the framework of the Geneva Protocol of 1925. The recent labours of the General Assembly and the Committee on Disarmament have given to the problem a timeliness and an impetus which reveal the great interest of the agreement in search of which serious efforts are being made at the present time, for it is in fact necessary to complete and thus reinforce that Protocol by the adoption of new legal measures aimed at the total elimination of this category of weapons. We must indeed recognize that this task is not at all easy, for the divergences of view more or less at the beginning are serious and concern the core of the problem, since the drafts do not envisage the same prohibitions, or at any rate seek to achieve them at different times. The delegation of the United Kingdom, which took the initiative of submitting a draft convention on the prohibition of the means of biological warfare, considers that the path to follow is to conclude first of all a convention on the prohibition of biological means of warfare.

13. The other draft, submitted by the nine socialist States, advocates their simultaneous examination, leading to an over-all agreement on the elimination of chemical and bacteriological agents for military purposes. In line with those divergences there is on the part of some the desire to achieve without delay an agreement, even though it be a partial agreement, rather than continue to deal, without any foreseeable results, with the technical and legal difficulties which would be raised by the hypothesis of a single convention covering the two categories of weapons, weapons which have

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different characteristics and raise control problems of a different character. On the part of others there is the desire to avoid the creation, by different legal instruments, of a distinction which does not exist in fact and which might run the risk of leaving in suspense, and for a dangerously indefinite time, the question of chemical weapons, the dangers of which are also real, and of weakening by that separation, the Geneva Protocol, which extended the same prohibition to both categories of weapons. Certainly each of those theses is supported by a certain number of considerations justifying it, though in a certain measure only.

14. I said at the outset of this statement that faced with the difficulties in solving disarmament problems by an immediate procedure, which is impossible in present circumstances, we would always favour the search for partial solutions which would lead progressively to a final result. From that point of view the procedure envisaged in the United Kingdom draft would seem to be a practical one only if our efforts permitted us to avoid maintaining two equally rigid positions. That method, to which we have had recourse in the past almost in desperation, has nevertheless proved to be extremely useful because it permitted, in the face of the many obstacles standing in the way of general and complete disarmament, the conclusion of agreements on certain particular aspects of partial disarmament, and we owe to that approach some non-negligible successes, such as the partial test-ban Treaty (ENDC/100/Rev.1), the signature of the non-proliferation Treaty and the progress achieved so far on the treaty on the demilitarization of the sea-bed and the ocean floor. I do not believe, however, that the Committee has already exhausted all the possibilities and is now condemned to the choice between an agreement on biological weapons and no agreement at all. Furthermore -- and even if we recognize the technical distinctions between the two categories of weapons, biological and chemical, and if we accept the difference of degree in their harmful effects, the tactical aspect of the one and the strategic aspect of the other, the facility of verification concerning the one and its complexity concerning the other -- the certain conclusions of such an analysis do not seem to outweigh the advantages of a prohibition of the two categories of weapons simultaneously and the incorporation of that prohibition in a single text.

15. As for the draft of the socialist countries, it recalls that the existence of these weapons constitutes a real threat to relations between States, thus worsening the international situation, and it envisages, in view of that fact, a global prohibition of the two types of weapons. According to the authors of the draft those weapons are

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launched by almost identical means and can be used just as well for tactical as for strategic purposes; finally, it is difficult to establish a system of control capable of verifying whether it is the one type or the other which is being used. In fact, the essential problem, which raises the major difficulty on this question, concerns the definition of a system of verification and control and the ways and means of guaranteeing the faithful observance by the parties of all the provisions of the agreement in the field of chemical and bacteriological weapons, whatever form such an agreement may take.

16. We must, then, recognize that it is always on the problem of control that the disarmament debate has encountered its most serious obstacles. It is the control problem that has for ten years blocked or slowed down useful discussion of the problem of disarmament in all its aspects. We believe that genuine prohibition of chemical as well as bacteriological weapons could indeed be achieved if we were able to define an adequate verification system. Many delegations have rightly emphasized that aspect of the difficulties of our debate and have recognized that the problem is essentially one of mutual confidence, which is indispensable in international relations -- that is to say, the fundamental aspect of the disarmament question is well and truly and first and foremost a political problem.

17. Pertinent suggestions have been made by a number of delegations, aimed not only at making a constructive contribution to the search for adequate technical standards for assuring the most effective control but also at introducing into the debate the elements necessary for the re-establishment of general confidence. In that connexion the representative of Sweden, Mrs.Myrdal, has told us authoritatively that the main objective of any verification procedure must be to generate first of all mutual trust, and that two basic principles are necessary in order to create that trust and make it grow: open information and internationalization (CCD/PV.463, para. 16, p.12-15). The Deputy Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia, Mr. Vratuša, speaking on 10 March, made the proposal that all States should take legal measures aimed at placing under the control of the civil administration all institutions engaged in research on and development and production of chemical and bacteriological

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weapons (CCD/PV.456, para.35). That idea was fully developed by the Yugoslav delegation and seems now to have received the support of a number of delegations. Mr. Abe of Japan reiterated at our meeting of 10 March the suggestion made by the Japanese delegation last year for the convening of an international meeting of experts entrusted with the study of the technical aspects of verification concerning the prohibition of the production, development and stockpiling of chemical and biological weapons (CCD/PV.456, para.81).

18. In addition, specific proposals have been made that bodies such as the World Health Organization, the Food and Agriculture Organization and the International Disarmament Organization could possibly serve as the organs of control and verification. We should like to express our support to the authors of those formulas which, by complementing each other, might permit the definition of a system of verification capable of guaranteeing the observance of the agreement and of attracting the support of diametrically opposed parties. If that is indeed the main political preoccupation of the authors of the two drafts it seems to us that the concentration of efforts for the fullest exploration of the Yugoslav and Swedish suggestions would lead to the development of a satisfactory verification system. And if, as has been said in the Committee, there could be no infallible verification system, reciprocal confidence might give to the system of verification adopted the necessary guarantee of the faithful observance by all the parties of the agreement on prohibition. Such a system of verification might be framed on the following lines:

19. First, the production, development and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological weapons should be jointly prohibited by the provisions of a main legal instrument envisaging also the destruction of those weapons. The first article of such instrument, and possibly also the second, would clearly envisage that prohibition.

20. Secondly, the procedures concerning verification and the guarantees ensuring respect for the commitments would be dealt with separately, according to whether they related to biological or chemical agents.

21. Thirdly, the procedures of verification concerning biological weapons would be determined definitively by the provisions of the main instrument. The total elimination of those weapons could be effective from the time of the entry into force of the instrument.

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22. Fourthly, considering the present difficulties posed by the problem of verification as regards chemical weapons, we might perhaps include in the same instrument precise provisions for a further study aimed at the conclusion, within a period fixed in advance, of an agreement on the verification procedures concerning chemical weapons.

23. This complementary agreement, whose legal form would be determined in the main instrument, would make effective the total and final implementation of provisions prohibiting these weapons.

24. Before concluding I should like to make certain comments on the different proposals concerning the complaints procedure. For obvious political reasons, and without any hesitation, we would be very eager to retain the formula of recourse to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. We see in such a formula the strengthening which we repeatedly demand of the authority of the Secretary-General. I am sure that a great many States Members of the international organization would be thankful for such a procedure. Unfortunately, given the limitations put by certain great Powers, directly or indirectly, on the authority of the Secretary-General, it is preferable to envisage a formula which would not have this dangerous character, which would lessen its value and prevent recourse to it because of actions which would run counter to the authority of the Secretary-General, which must not be restricted in that field. The proposals made by the delegations of Poland, Hungary and Mongolia (CCD/285 and Corr.1) deserve careful attention, and here too we would be happy to see the Security Council assuming such a great responsibility in the field of disarmament. However, the machinery of the Security Council and the bargaining processes which precede its decisions lead us to try to surround that formula with complementary measures. Another aspect which, in spite of its other advantages, inspires certain reservations on our part is the use of the right of veto, which might lead the Council to adopt a negative attitude in sometimes very disturbing cases. I should like, finally, to indicate the risk of possible exclusion by one or other group in the Council on grounds of nationality or personality of one or several of the experts who might be called upon by the Council for the enquiries envisaged. In fact, the two formulas proposed for this complaints procedure could more usefully complement each other and become, as in normal legal procedure, two hierarchical instances of recourse, thus ensuring greater effectiveness.

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25. The report of the Secretary-General established by a group of experts (A/7575/Rev.1) leaves no doubt, from the scientific point of view, of the real danger of chemical and biological weapons. At the present stage of science, the danger of those two means of warfare is certain and the distinction, although justified from the technical point of view, between biological weapons and chemical weapons remains a simple academic question. In the different statements which accompanied the presentation of the two drafts submitted for our examination we note that the authors of both show equal sincerity. We understand the preoccupations inspired by the absence or the weakness of control. But the essential thing for us is to find among the positive formulas which have been put forward the common denominator which can lead us without further delay to the prohibition of chemical and biological weapons.

26. Mr. ROSHCHIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): I should like to begin by adding the congratulations of the Soviet delegation to those extended to the United States delegation on the occasion of the return to earth of the three courageous astronauts of the spaceship Apollo 13. We are deeply gratified that the enormous difficulties connected with their return to earth were successfully overcome and that the severe ordeal to which the astronauts Lovell, Swigert and Haise were subjected had a happy outcome.

27. We have listened with interest to the statement of Ambassador Benhima, the representative of Morocco, and shall consider his remarks with close attention.

28. In its statement in this Committee on 17 February, the Soviet delegation said that, besides studying and reaching agreement on some collateral measures in the field of disarmament, the Committee must make further efforts to solve the problem of general and complete disarmament (CCD/PV.449, para.55). In the opinion of the Soviet Union, this problem is today's most important task, a task whose solution is in the fundamental interests of the peoples, since it is directly bound up with the maintenance of peace and the security of all States. It is to this task, which was entrusted to the Committee as its main responsibility at the time of its establishment, that we also wish to devote our statement today.

29. Since the earliest days of its existence, the Soviet State has persistently striven to establish a durable peace, strengthen international security and achieve disarmament. The Soviet Government's first enactment was the Decree on Peace of

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26 October 1917, which set the "goals of liberating mankind from the horrors of war and its consequences". The teaching of Lenin, the founder of the Soviet State, that "disarmament is an ideal of socialism" has been one of the cornerstones of Soviet foreign policy. We should like to recall those words of Lenin once again today, particularly as our country, together with all progressive men and women, is now celebrating the centenary of the birth of that brilliant thinker and political figure whose works and activity have served and will continue to serve the cause of peace on our planet.

30. The struggle for disarmament has been an integral feature of the Soviet State's policy at every stage. In July 1921, the Soviet Government, protesting against the refusal of the Western Powers to invite Soviet Russia to participate in the Washington conference on the limitation of naval armaments, declared that it would welcome any disarmament or reduction in military expenditure, which weighs so heavily on the workers of all countries.

31. At the Genoa conference of 1922, the Soviet delegation, acting on direct instructions from Lenin, proposed a general reduction in the armaments and armed forces of all States, with a complete prohibition of the most barbaric forms of warfare such as the use of poison gases, air raids and, in particular the use of means of destruction directed against the civilian population.

32. In 1927, at the fourth session of the Preparatory Commission of the League of Nations for the Disarmament Conference, the Soviet Union submitted a radical disarmament plan containing basic principles for general and complete disarmament. Thereafter, down to the outbreak of the Second World War, the Soviet Union repeatedly put forward far-reaching and radical disarmament proposals, the implementation of which could have materially altered the whole course of events preceding the Second World War.

33. After the Second World War, the Soviet Union put forward a broad programme of general and complete disarmament and proposed the simultaneous implementation of a series of partial measures to slow down the arms race and ease international tension. With the emergence of nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union, in view of the danger created for the whole human race, demanded the complete prohibition of such weapons, the discontinuance of their production and the destruction of existing stockpiles.

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The central theme of all Soviet proposals on disarmament questions since the Second Worl War has been the prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons and other types of weapons of mass destruction. The Soviet Union raised the question of the implementation of general and complete disarmament in the United Nations in 1959 (A/4218 and 4219), and in 1962, it submitted to the Eighteen-Nations Committee on Disarmament a specific plan for the execution of this task in the form of a draft treaty providing for such disarmament (ENDC/2/Rev.1).

34. The idea of general and complete disarmament has since gained universal acceptance. The need to solve this problem has been stressed by the United Nations: United Nations General Assembly resolution 1378 (XIV) of 20 November 1959 pointed out that "the question of general and complete disarmament is the most important one facing the world today".

35. The need to solve this problem is gaining in importance and urgency with every passing year, as is demonstrated by a number of political, scientific and technological factors. In this connexion, reference should be made in the first place to the accelerated increase in armaments and military expenditure, particularly in the last few years. Figures have already been quoted in this Committee to show that military expenditure has almost doubled during the past decade and that last year it reached the figure of $200,000 million. Over the past six years, it has amounted to over $1 million million. Yet history has repeatedly shown that the armaments race does not guarantee the security of States. On the contrary, it serves to exacerbate international tension, increases the threat of general conflict and is in itself convincing evidence of the need for the implementation of disarmament measures and for the fullest possible solution to that problem.

36. There is yet another highly significant factor which makes the solution of this problem of general and complete disarmament a matter of urgent necessity, namely the tremendous progress in science and technology. The great discoveries of recent decades in the field of nuclear physics, chemistry, computer technology and other branches of science and technology have provided man with great opportunities for harnessing the forces of nature for the improvement of his well-being. Scientific and technological progress has, however, also resulted in the emergence of new types of weapons of mass destruction.with an immense capacity for devastation and

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annihilation. The development of new types of weapons has raised the problem of preventing the achievements of science and technology from being used to the detriment of human beings. The most effective solution of this problem is general and complete disarmament.

37. Concern at the dangerous trend of recent developments in the world has been reflected in the statements made by many delegations in the United Nations and in the Committee on Disarmament, as well as in resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly. Thus resolution 2454 B (XXIII) stated that "the armaments race, in particular the nuclear arms race, constitutes a threat to peace". In the same resolution the Committee is requested to make renewed efforts towards achieving substantial progress in reaching agreement on the question of general and complete disarmament (ENDC/237). Stress was also laid on the need for such disarmament in resolutions adopted at the twenty-fourth session. Attention has similarly been drawn to this need by many delegations during the present session of this Committee. Thus, Mr. Ahmed, the representative of Pakistan, said in his statement:

> "... unless and until a serious attempt is made to tackle this problem now, we may find that the passage of time has created new obstacles to progress" (CCD/PV.456.para.16).

38. In making the present appeal for steps towards the attainment of agreement on general and complete disarmament, the Soviet Union also has in mind that the disarmament negotiations have led to certain positive results which are helping to check the further extension of the arms race. In this connexion, we would draw attention to the great importance for the solution of the problem of general and complete disarmament of the international agreements on certain collateral measures of disarmament which have been concluded in recent years and are now in force. These agreements include, first and foremost, the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water (ENDC/100/Rev.1), the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space (General Assembly resolution 2222 (XXI) annex) and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (ENDC/226*). The consistent implementation of these treaties is bound to have a favourable effect on the world situation, to strengthen the security of States and to create favourable conditions for further progress towards a solution of the problem of general and complete disarmament.

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39. Another positive factor contributing to a solution of this problem is the experience gained in the talks on individual disarmament problems which led to the above-mentioned international treaties and agreements in this field. Moreover, some work has already been done in the past in reaching agreement on general principles and on a general approach to the solution of the problem of general and complete disarmament. The principles for disarmament negotiations set out in the Joint Statement by the USSR and the United States of 20 September 1961 (A/4879) (ENDC/5) were drawn up and agreed upon.

40. That document, which could serve as a useful basis for negotiations on this problem, defines in general terms the goals of the negotiations, the scope and content of a programme of general and complete disarmament, the principle of implementing disarmament by stages, the criteria for transition from one stage to the next, and the principle of a balanced implementation of disarmament under strict and effective international control. Efforts have also been made to achieve a more concrete solution of the problem of general and complete disarmament. At the outset of the activities of the Committee on Disarmament in 1962, the Soviet Union submitted for the Committee's consideration a draft treaty on general and complete disarmament, covering the entire range of measures in this field, including measures to safeguard the security of States and maintain international peace after completion of the entire disarmament process. The importance of this Soviet proposal was emphasized by a number of delegations which have spoken on this problem in the Committee and have called for continued efforts to find a practical solution to the problem of general and complete disarmament.

41. We are gratified to find that the appeal made by the Soviet Union during this session of the Committee for further steps towards the attainment of agreement on general and complete disarmament has met with approval in the Committee, and many delegations have drawn attention to the timeliness of the Soviet side's action in raising this problem. In his statement on 24 February Mr. Khattabi, the Moroccan representative, said: "I should now like to note and stress the importance of the Soviet proposal to resume work relating to general and complete disarmament". (CCD/PV.452.Para.63). Ambassador Könives, the Hungarian representative, has also drawn attention to the need for a thorough discussion of the problem of general and complete disarmament in the Committee on Disarmament (CCD/PV.456, paras.23-26).

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Deputy Foreign Minister Vratuša, the Yugoslav representative said in this Committee that "it is high time we began dealing with it in a systematic and organized way." (Ibid., para.39). The Burmese, Nigerian and many other delegations have similarly expressed themselves in favour of resuming the discussion of the problem of general and complete disarmament in this Committee.

42. Another favourable development in our view, is the fact that the delegations of several countries members of this Committee have not only made general statements in favour of activating negotiations on general and complete disarmament, but have also made some specific suggestions regarding the appropriate procedure and basis for the conduct of these negotiations in order to ensure their success and avoid the difficulties encountered in the past. In their statement, the representatives of India, Ethiopia, Mexico, Brazil, Argentina and other States have put forward the idea that the Soviet Union and the United States should submit revised versions of their proposals on general and complete disarmament in the light of the changes which have occurred in the field of disarmament since these proposals were submitted to the Committee in 1962.

43. Many representatives in the Committee have also expressed the view that it would be desirable to work out a broad disarmament programme, which would take into account the need to carry out the most important and urgent measures first and which would lead to general and complete disarmament. They have stressed that the preparation of such a programme requires a certain amount of flexibility. Thus, Ambassador Khallaf, the representative of the United Arab Republic, has said:

> "... importance and urgency alone are not the only criteria for setting up priorities; for we shall have to keep in mind our possibilities, the degree of maturity attained by the various issues; and the conditions prevailing on the international scene. In face of such difficulties we believe that our purpose would be served best by showing initiative, imagination and flexibility when probing together the conception of a

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comprehensive programme, while keeping in mind that too rigid programming would carry within its specifics the risk of setbacks and, indeed, of failure." (CCD/PV.452, para.39)

44. Suggestions and proposals relating to individual aspects of the problem of general and complete disarmament, which we are studying carefully, have also been made in this Committee. Thus, Ambassador Jarosek, the representative of the Polish People's Republic, stressed in his statement the need, in working out a disarmament programme, to stipulate that measures of nuclear disarmament should be carried out at the beginning of the process of general and complete disarmament (ENDC/PV.406,para.7). The proposals and suggestions made by the delegations of Italy, India, Japan and other States during the discussion of this problem also deserve careful consideration.

45. In its statement on 17 February, the Soviet delegation declared that agreement on general and complete disarmament could be reached only with the participation of the maximum number of States of military importance, and in the first place of the nuclear Powers (CCD/PV.449,para.58). We note with satisfaction that this point of view has gained the support and understanding of many members of the Committee. This is confirmed by the statements made in the Committee by the delegations of Ethiopia, India, Burma and other States. It is quite natural that, for reasons of national security, no State will be able to carry out, consistently and completely, radical measures to reduce its armaments and armed forces unless other countries follow suit.

46. Bearing in mind the significance of the problem of general and complete disarmament and the importance of its resumed consideration by the Committee, the Soviet delegation calls upon members of the Committee to continue the specific and detailed discussion of this issue and endeavour to ensure progress towards its solution. For our part, we shall show full readiness to give careful consideration to all suggestions made by representatives with a view to finding the most rational

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approach to the solution of the problem. In making this proposal, it is by no means our view that the Committee should relax its efforts to bring about international agreements with respect to collateral measures. On the contrary, our basic thesis is that activation of the discussion on general and complete disarmament should be accompanied by even more resolute efforts to reach agreement on partial measures which would end the arms race and create a favourable climate for execution of measures which will ultimately lead to the achievement of general and complete disarmament.

47. For its part, the Soviet Union will continue its efforts to work for the speediest possible achievement of agreements on other disarmament measures, such as the prohibition of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, the banning of the emplacement of weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed, the prohibition of all nuclear weapon tests, including underground tests, and other collateral measures. Another indication of the Soviet side's readiness to work in this direction is its desire to continue in a spirit of goodwill bilateral negotiations with the United States on curbing the strategic arms race, with a view to finding a mutually acceptable solution to this major problem.

48. The Soviet delegation hopes that the delegations of the States members of the Committee on Disarmament will make their contribution to the search for ways of achieving general and complete disarmament. This would enable the Committee to fulfil the main task entrusted to it at the time of its establishment. It is on the successful solution of that problem that the future of all mankind largely depends.

49. The CHAIRMAN (Japan): Before I call on the next speaker I should like to draw the attention of the Committee to the fact that a working paper has been distributed this morning under the heading "Working Paper on Toxins" (CCD/286).

50. Mr. LEONARD (United States of America): May I first express our appreciation for the very moving comments made by speakers this morning, as well as last week, and those made to us privately on the subject of Apollo 13. Our delegation, like our entire people, followed closely those stirring events and shared in the great relief and joy which was so widely felt at the safe return to earth of the astronauts. This event underlined in a most dramatic way the fundamental unity of mankind, through the extraordinarily widespread and intense concern demonstrated last week in every part of the globe for the welfare of the astronauts, and I am confident that the implications of that demonstration of unity for us here, for the vital task with which we are charged, are clear to all of us.

51. I should like next to refer to the document which our delegation has just circulated (CCD/286), which you Mr. Chairman have just mentioned, on the subject of one important class of chemicals certain of which could be used as agents of chemical warfare -- that is to say, toxins. The Committee will recall that the United States has itself adopted the same policy on toxins as it adopted earlier with respect to biological weapons. Toxins are briefly described in our working paper and attention is drawn to a number of their characteristics which we feel to be particularly important from the arms control point of view. We hope that in this way we shall be making a further contribution to the Committee's work, a contribution supplementing our earlier working paper on the interrelationships of the peaceful uses of certain more or less common chemicals and their possible military applications (CCD/283).

52. I should like to make a brief statement on the general subject of chemical and biological warfare. The position of my Government was set forth in detail on 17 March (CCD/PV.458, paras. 46 et seq.). Since then, however, several statements have been made in plenary meetings which either misrepresented the United States position or offered arguments which we feel are not well founded. Let me first of all once again make it clear that the United States is committed to achieving effective controls on chemical as well as biological weapons. Our differences with some members of this Committee centre on the present feasibility of attempting to eliminate the threats posed by those two types of weapons at the same time and in a single instrument. We

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do not think that such a single instrument covering both chemical and biological weapons is now feasible. We believe that the Committee could, if it wished, move directly to negotiate a very simple and straightforward agreement prohibiting biological methods of warfare. It seems obvious to us, however, that chemical weapons pose complex problems which will require more time and effort to resolve. In fact the discussions in the Committee so far this session bear witness to the time that will be required to reach agreement on chemical weapons.

53. It has been asserted that the effect of a separate convention on biological weapons would be to legitimize and even to stimulate the production and stockpiling of chemical weapons. In fact it has even been alleged that the motivation of those governments which advocate a separate convention on biological weapons is precisely to leave themselves free to engage in an arms race in the field of chemical weapons. That is simply not true, and I think such attacks do not make a positive contribution to our work. The United States is fully prepared -- indeed is determined -- to make a genuine effort to solve the problems involved in expanding the already existing prohibitions against chemical warfare at the same time as we proceed with the easier task of a total ban on biological warfare.

54. Moreover, it is difficult to see any logic in the argument that a separate ban on biological weapons would stimulate production of chemical weapons. The same logic would suggest that it was not desirable to agree to arms control measures concerning nuclear weapons since any restraints on nuclear weapons could encourage an arms race in conventional weapons. This Committee has not accepted any such proposition in relation to conventional and nuclear weapons and there is no reason to accept a parallel proposition relating to biological and chemical weapons. As we have pointed out, biological and chemical weapons would have different roles if ever used in a war, and there is simply no logic in suggesting that a country would have more need for chemical weapons if it relinquished biological weapons.

55. I might describe our concept of handling chemical and biological weapons as involving a simultaneous advance along two or possibly more tracks. If we are able to proceed more quickly on one track -- and we believe that will prove to be the case with biological weapons -- we hope the Committee will fully exploit that opportunity to make concrete progress, meanwhile moving as quickly as possible down the other track or tracks. If we follow that pragmatic course of action it seems only reasonable that as soon as we come to the end of any track we should formalize the agreement thus reached in a treaty text.

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56. There are serious problems to be solved in developing additional, generally-acceptable prohibitions on chemical weapons. These problems are not insoluble. The United States, contrary to the assertions of some, does not suggest that they are insoluble or that the problems of chemical weapons should be "put off to the indefinite future". On the contrary, it is our position that we should work on these problems now. At the same time, we recognize, and are prepared to say frankly, that this task will at best require efforts extending beyond this year. To cite only one problem, the insistence of some delegations that there is no need for effective verification to be included in a chemical weapons prohibition, if this position is maintained, will be in itself a major barrier to agreement.

57. We believe that many governments, not only the United States, would not be willing to support a treaty banning the production and stockpiling of chemical weapons if that treaty were not subject to reliable verification procedures. Our own research so far leads us to believe that any verification system for chemical agents which did not include effective monitoring and inspection provisions would not be adequate. We shall be discussing the subject of verification at our informal session tomorrow, but for now I wish to note that we find that the proposals made on 14 April by the Polish delegation (CCD/PV.464, para. 4 et seq.) do not constitute a satisfactory system for verifying a ban on the possession of modern chemical weapons. It is not adequate to suggest that there will be a complaint mechanism when there may be no means of knowing whether and when the facts exist for invoking the mechanism.

58. An extremely serious arms control problem in the chemical weapons field concerns a prohibition on the possession of nerve agents. The possession of nerve agents does not give any Power a clear military advantage when it has reason to believe that a potential opponent will be prepared to retaliate with nerve agents. But the one-sided possession of nerve agents could offer unacceptable advantages to the Power possessing them. And, let me emphasize, such a situation would inevitably increase the temptation to use nerve agents in any conflict. Thus, chemical warfare could become more, rather than less, likely — a result hardly in keeping with the objectives of this Committee.

59. We have heard it suggested that the United States, as well as some other major Powers, need not fear this consequence because we could always, so to speak, even the score with nuclear weapons. That argument is one which, in full candour, we are surprised to hear from any member of this Committee. It seems to us that anyone who suggests retaliating with nuclear weapons in the event of a chemical attack is abrogating his responsibility to find meaningful arms control solutions to the problems of chemical weapons.

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60. It is fortunately the case with biological weapons, however, that the problem of verification does not present a serious barrier to progress. Although it is true that systematic inspection with the objective of detecting small-scale violations of a ban on biological weapons would pose difficult problems, those problems would be much less intractable in the case of a suspected large-scale biological weapons installation. At the same time there are quite logical reasons why such inspection is not necessary. The principal purpose of verification in this situation is to assure parties that they need not maintain a particular weapons capability for purposes of deterrence or retaliation. Because biological weapons inherently lack reliability as an effective deterrent or instrument of retaliation, even their known retention by one State should not affect another State's decision to give them up. Knowledge of whether another country in fact has biological weapons is therefore considerably less significant than in cases such as chemical weapons where such knowledge could lead other countries to meet the threat by developing a capability to retaliate in kind.

61. The question has been asked what the value will be of a separate biological weapons prohibition. In our view the value is that such an agreement will reduce substantially the likelihood that any State will maintain a biological weapons capability. It will thus reduce the danger that disease will ever be used as a weapon of war. In that regard I have been concerned that our view of the usefulness of biological warfare as a weapon has been distorted. We have maintained that biological warfare is not an effective retaliatory weapon, but we do not by any means assert that it would be a useless weapon in all circumstances. The military characteristics required of a retaliatory weapon may be rather different from those of a weapon intended for first use. Still other military characteristics may be required for a covert or sabotage weapon. Certain biological weapons could in fact be used either for a massive first-use attack or for a sabotage attack. There are a number of biological agents currently available for those purposes. The continued development of these weapons would increase the danger of a way being found to produce strains of biological agents which would be resistant to medical therapy.

62. Those who believe that biological weapons would have little military value for first use or sabotage perhaps have not consulted the excellent report of the World Health Organization on chemical and biological weapons[1/]. That report gives the

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1/ Health Aspects of Chemical and Biological Weapons, Report of a WHO Group of Consultants, Geneva, 1970.

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following estimates: a single bomber disseminating only 50 kilogrammes of a lethal agent over a city could cause hundreds of thousands of deaths; sabotage of a communal water supply could cause death and disruption to tens of thousands of people; and either sabotage or open attack which led to a secondary spread of epidemic could, under certain conditions, result in millions of illnesses and deaths. As the WHO report makes clear, it is already well within the capability of a number of States to bring about these potential casualties, and such a capability could be acquired by many more.

63. We therefore see ample reason to prohibit biological weapons and to do it promptly, and we see no barrier to taking this step. Looked at from another direction, we can see no advantage to the governments of the world in refraining from taking this step. To leave open the option of producing and stockpiling biological weapons does not in any way make it more likely that we shall deal effectively with chemical weapons. Chemical warfare presents its own problems and those problems will have to be taken care of in their own way. That task will not be made easier by leaving States free to produce biological weapons. Rather we can see the reverse as being true: a successful agreement on biological weapons could give greater momentum to our deliberations on chemical weapons.

64. Certainly those who urge that control of biological weapons must await the control of chemical weapons cannot seriously believe that the United States or any other government would adopt what it considers an unsound approach to chemical warfare in order to reach agreement on biological warfare. Biological warfare is not a useful hostage or a useful lever. None of us can be sure how long it will take us to formulate new prohibitions on the possession of chemical weapons, but clearly that process will be extensive and difficult. We hope that in this Committee we can all face this fact honestly and that we shall not lose this chance for progress by doctrinaire insistence on a linkage between these two types of weapons. One thing is quite clear: we shall not advance more rapidly toward our goal of banning the possession of both chemical weapons and biological weapons by refraining for an indefinite period from banning disease as a weapon of war.

65. Mr. PETROV (Bulgaria) (interpretation from French): Allow me to add the congratulations of our delegation to those addressed to the delegation of the United States on the occasion of the successful return of the three American astronauts, who

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have given proof of exceptional courage, coolness and self-control. We are happy that they have overcome all the difficulties and perils of their dramatic expedition and that they have returned safe and sound to earth.

66. My delegation has had occasion to put forward at this session the views and ideas of our Government on the whole group of problems posed by the horrible menace of chemical and bacteriological weapons. May I be permitted today to draw the attention of the Committee to only one of these problems, that of the verification and control of the obligations under an agreement envisaging the complete elimination of chemical and bacteriological weapons. Working paper CCD/285, submitted by the delegations of the Hungarian People's Republic, the Mongolian People's Republic, and the Polish People's Republic, represents a most pertinent contribution towards the solution of that problem. We are happy to give it our fullest support. This initiative is a new expression of the will and the sincere desire of the socialist countries to contribute to the complete and unconditional prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons.

67. We should like to express our appreciation to the delegations of Hungary, Mongolia and Poland who have worked assiduously and formulated a draft clause on guarantees which, together with the draft resolution of the Security Council, meets the wishes expressed both in our Committee and in the General Assembly. The initiative of the three socialist countries completes the provisions of articles 4, 5 and 6 of the draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and on the destruction of such weapons submitted by nine socialist countries to the last session of the General Assembly (A/7655). Thus, a system of verification and control is advocated, a system based on two fundamental principles: verification and strict control by national governments of the observance of the prohibition on their territory and the establishment of international responsibilities for those governments in the event of failure to fulfil the obligations assumed.

68. This system is, to our mind, the only rational way of ensuring observance of the complete prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons. The particular features of those weapons -- we know full well that often the same agents can be used for both military and peaceful purposes -- do not permit the establishment of a sure and effective form of international control. This is shown in the report of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute on chemical and biological weapons[1/], and has

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1/ "The Problem of Chemical and Biological Warfare".

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been emphasized by many delegations in our Committee. The difficulty of establishing a system of control at international level was the main factor which led the authors of the 1961 Convention on narcotics[1/] to create a system of control and verification based exclusively on national means. In their draft convention the socialist countries, having regard to those difficulties, have included in article 5 the undertaking by the parties

> "... to take as soon as possible ... the necessary legislative and administrative measures to prohibit the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and to destroy such weapons" (op cit.).

69. In fact, a form of national control has already been established spontaneously, without conferences and without committees. The revelation and the condemnation of preparations for chemical and bacteriological warfare and of the use of certain chemical weapons by a great Power bear witness to this. Suffice it to refer to the numerous declarations and protestations made by scientists from all over the world and even by eminent United States scientists who are in the best position to assess all the dangers of chemical and bacteriological weapons and to sound the alert.

70. On the other hand, the proposals of the three socialist countries concerning international responsibilities and the right to lodge a complaint with the Security Council and to request the co-operation of the parties concerned and an enquiry in the event of violation of the prohibition would make a possible agreement on the complete prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons more viable.

71. Our Committee undertakes in an ever more practical manner the discussion of the problem of the total prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons. All the conditions are there for us to tackle the decisive phase, the legislative phase, as it were, of this discussion. We have no right to prolong the delay which has occurred so far because that delay in fact has a bad effect on peace and security. The various arguments used to increase the delay are not based on technical motives. To our mind, the conclusion of an agreement to ban completely all chemical and bacteriological weapons is prevented by political considerations. Certain countries are anxious to create artificial obstacles to a total ban in order to retain in their military arsenals those formidable weapons of mass destruction, toxic agents, for use against

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1/ United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 520, pp. 204 et seq.

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the peoples and the natural resources of countries which they are not in a position to master with so-called conventional means of warfare. The tragic case of Viet Nam is striking proof which the most subtle sophistry cannot refute. My delegation rejects any attempt to delay, to make impossible, the decisive and complete prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons.

72. It was precisely in order to facilitate the preparation of such a prohibition that the delegations of Hungary, Mongolia and Poland took the initiative of submitting to us the draft clauses on guarantees and the draft resolution of the Security Council contained in document CCD/285. We are convinced that those proposals will be accorded the full attention of the Committee and will enjoy the support of the large majority of its members.

73. The CHAIRMAN (Japan): May I join those representatives who have already expressed great satisfaction and sincere congratulations to the representative of the United States on the safe return to earth of his country's three astronauts. I hope that these few words of mine interpret the feelings of other colleagues who have not so far spoken on this happy outcome of a difficult venture.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament today held its 466th plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of H.E. Ambassador Isao Abe, representative of Japan.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Morocco, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United States of America and Bulgaria, and by the Chairman.

"The delegation of the United States of America submitted a working paper on toxins (CCD/286).

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 23 April 1970, at 10.30 a.m."

74. The CHAIRMAN (Japan): May I remind the members of the Committee that at our meeting on 7 April it was decided to convene an informal meeting to discuss the question of the prohibition of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons (CCD/PV.462, para. 104). This meeting will be held tomorrow in this Chamber at 10.30 a.m.

The meeting rose at 12.5 p.m.